

Changing conditions in the US labor market *Effects of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986*

KATHARINE M. DONATO,¹ JORGE DURAND² &
DOUGLAS S. MASSEY³

¹*Department of Sociology, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA 70803, USA;* ²*Centro de Investigaciones sobre los Movimientos Sociales, Universidad de Guadalajara, Guadalajara, Mexico;* ³*Population Research Center, Department of Sociology, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL 60637, USA*

Abstract. In this paper, we assess the extent to which the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 affected US labor market conditions facing Mexican migrant workers. Using data gathered from migrants in ten Mexican communities, as well as out-migrants from those communities located in the USA, we examined whether and how IRCA affected US wages, hours worked, and the terms of employment. Estimated period effects did not indicate a clear break in most of these variables following IRCA's passage in 1986, except for hours worked and monthly income. Our analyses did reveal a fairly consistent pattern of deterioration in the labor market conditions facing undocumented migrants, however. Compared to illegal migrants working in the USA before IRCA, those migrating afterward worked fewer hours and were less likely to have taxes withheld from their pay. We also found evidence that undocumented migrants were pushed from the agrarian to the urban economy by the increase in labor supply occasioned by the SAW program.

Introduction

The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 was the first piece of legislation in US history explicitly designed to reduce the volume of undocumented migration to the United States. Through employer sanctions, legalization programs, and increased border enforcement, IRCA sought to curb the movement of undocumented migrants across US borders. Its provisions were extensive, and its consequences extend well beyond issues pertaining only to immigration. In the present analysis, we focus on changes in the US labor market that may have resulted from IRCA.

Prior work has focused mainly on whether IRCA accomplished its intended goal of reducing undocumented migration from Mexico. Using apprehensions data collected by the US Immigration and Naturalization Service, two studies documented a decline in the number of arrests made at the USA–Mexico border following IRCA's implementation in 1986 (Bean et al. 1989; White et al. 1990). As we have argued elsewhere, however, this decline does not necessarily indicate a deterrent effect, since it could have been produced by the amnesty of over two million migrants removed from the seasonal flow (Donato et al. 1992).

Other studies using data from Mexican sending communities have found

little evidence that IRCA has deterred undocumented migration (Cornelius 1989, 1990; Bustamante 1990; González & Escobar 1990; Massey et al. 1990). A comprehensive analysis of data gathered in seven Mexican communities and US destination areas found that IRCA did not reduce the probability of taking a first trip without documents, or of making additional illegal trips. Moreover, it had no apparent effect on the cost of crossing the border surreptitiously or on the chances of being apprehended while doing so (Donato et al. 1992).

A few studies have examined how IRCA changed conditions in the US labor market. The US General Accounting Office (1990: 5–6), for example, found ‘a serious pattern of discrimination’ against Hispanics after IRCA’s passage in 1986. Likewise, Donato & Massey (1991) found that the economic penalties accruing to illegal status increased significantly after IRCA was implemented. In the post-IRCA period, undocumented Mexican migrants earned substantially lower wages than legal immigrants from the same communities. Rather than curtailing the hiring of undocumented migrants, employers seem to have adjusted to the increased risks posed IRCA by reducing the wages of undocumented workers.

IRCA also may have changed other conditions in US labor markets. By granting amnesty to more than two million people, it substantially increased the supply of legal workers in a few regional labor markets. Possessing more mobility and confidence than those without documents, newly legalized migrants may have been able to compete effectively for jobs. After IRCA, employers in many sectors, especially agriculture, were able to satisfy their labor needs with newly legalized workers, thereby circumventing the threat of employer sanctions and avoiding disruptions inherent in an undocumented workforce (such as unplanned absences because of sudden deportations). Informants in Mexican communities report that increased competition growing out of IRCA’s amnesty has pushed undocumented workers into irregular jobs that pay lower wages and offer fewer hours of work.

IRCA did not, however, lead to the aggressive pursuit of employers who continued to hire migrant workers. Consistent with Congress’ intent to gradually phase in sanctions and educate rather than punish employers, Fix & Hill (1991) found low overall levels of enforcement, uneven application of enforcement by geographic area, and differences in the methods and targets of enforcement in the 1987–89 period. Informants in Mexico also report that employer sanctions are rarely applied and that the amnesty, especially the SAW program, largely offset any effects that sanctions might have had on employers by expanding the supply of workers at their disposal.

In this paper, we evaluate IRCA’s effects on labor market conditions in two ways. First, we consider how IRCA may have changed the work conditions facing all Mexican migrants, legal and illegal; we do this by estimating regression equations that predict labor market outcomes from a set of background characteristics, geographic controls, and dummy variables for years before and after IRCA. Prior to 1986, undocumented migrants were the

primary source of labor in regional labor markets; after IRCA was signed into law, these labor markets were flooded with newly-legalized migrants as well as undocumented migrants. We expect their combined presence led to a deterioration in the labor market position of Mexican migrants after 1986. Second, we examine changes in the rewards and penalties associated with legal status. If IRCA's amnesty put newly-legalized migrants in a superior competitive position relative to those without documents, and if employers responded to IRCA's sanctions, then we expect a deterioration in the labor market position of undocumented migrants after 1986. To examine this possibility, we estimate separate pre- and post-IRCA regressions to predict labor market outcomes and then test for differences in the effect of undocumented status.

IRCA and its provisions

Since the turn of the century, US immigration policy has attempted to control the types of persons who legally enter and settle in the United States (Jasso & Rosenzweig 1990). IRCA is unusual since it represents the first legislative attempt to regulate *illegal* movement into the United States. The original intent of IRCA's sponsors was to sanction employers who knowingly hire undocumented workers (Bean et al. 1989). Before IRCA, it was illegal to 'harbor' anyone who entered the United States without documents, but the well-known 'Texas Proviso' specifically excluded employment as constituting harboring under the law (Teitelbaum 1986). Although illegal migrants were subject to arrest at any time, the employers who hired them were not.

After years of intense lobbying from organized labor, Congress finally repealed the Texas Proviso and employers are now required to verify a job applicant's right to work in the United States. Under current law, employers must fill out an I-9 form stating they have seen one or more documents that establish an applicant's identity and right to work. Employers who fail to fill out the form, or who knowingly hire undocumented workers, are subject to civil and criminal penalties that include fines up to US\$10,000 for repeated offenses. Prison terms may also be levied if employers are found to engage in 'a pattern or practice' of hiring undocumented workers (Bean et al. 1989).

By themselves, however, the employer sanctions would not have garnered enough political support to pass Congress. Additional support was secured from ethnic and religious groups when an amnesty program was added to accommodate illegal migrants who were long-term US residents; and congressional delegations from the southwest, particularly those representing grower interests in Texas and California, insisted on special provisions to legalize undocumented agricultural workers (Bean et al. 1989). Amnesty was thus offered to two kinds of migrants: those who had resided continuously in the United States since January 1, 1982 (known as Legally Authorized Workers, or LAWS), and those who could prove they worked for 90 days in

agricultural jobs during 1984–86 (known as Special Agricultural Workers, or SAWS).

The political coalition of organized labor, ethnic and religious groups, and southwestern growers proved irresistible, and IRCA was passed and signed into law in late 1986. Shortly thereafter massive legalizations began. As a result of IRCA, approximately 1.7 million undocumented migrants were granted temporary residence as LAWS and another 1.3 million persons became SAWS (Bean et al. 1989). Of these people, some 2.3 million were Mexicans and 800,000 were located in Los Angeles County alone. Five other Mexican receiving areas contained at least 100,000 amnesty applicants: Anaheim, Chicago, Houston, Riverside, and San Diego. An additional 150,000 legalizations occurred in agricultural areas of California, and another 135,000 took place in non-metropolitan areas of Texas (US Immigration and Naturalization Service 1990). Thus, IRCA substantially increased the supply of legal immigrant labor in a few key labor markets.

Data

In order to examine the effects of IRCA on labor market conditions, we use a new dataset that covers multiple sending communities and offers a large sample of both legal and undocumented migrants. The data were collected through representative surveys of ten communities located in the Mexican states of Jalisco, Michoacán, Guanajuato, and Nayarit, which have traditionally sent many migrants to the United States (Dagodag 1975; North & Houstoun 1976; Bustamante 1977; Jones 1988).¹ Within each community, 150 to 200 households were randomly selected and interviewed during December and January in successive years between 1987 and 1991 (two communities in 1987–88, four in 1988–89, three in 1989–90, and one in 1990–91). These months are best to locate US migrants in Mexico, since most return to spend the holidays with their families. Our sample is therefore representative of households occupied during the winter months of 1987–91 in these Mexican communities.

The community data were supplemented with a non-random survey of out-migrants located in the United States during the summer subsequent to the community survey. From the Mexican samples, interviewers determined where in the United States migrants had settled permanently and then went to those areas to interview households. Snowball sampling methods were used to compile a sample of roughly 20 out-migrant households in each of seven communities, yielding a total sample of 135 US households. (US surveys were not carried out for two communities because an interviewer dropped out of the project, and data are not yet available for one community.)

Although these data are not representative of all out-migrants from the sample communities, they do provide some control for biases stemming from

selective emigration. Mexicans go to the United States to work and earn money, and those who remain in the United States for long periods are likely to have met with above-average success, while those who returned home early are likely to have been less successful (Borjas 1985; Massey 1987). As a result, the Mexican community samples overrepresent economic failures, whereas the US samples overrepresent labor market successes. By combining the two samples, we gain some measure of control for these selection biases.

The survey questionnaire collected information on the social, economic, and demographic characteristics of persons in sample households. It asked whether household members, including the household head, spouse, and resident children, had ever been to the United States. For 962 household heads with US migrant experience, it also collected information about labor market conditions during the most recent trip to the United States. This information included hours worked per week, hourly wages, whether migrants were paid in cash, whether they worked in agriculture, and if they had federal taxes withheld.

We conceptualize these outcomes to be functions of selected personal and household characteristics.² Personal attributes refer to individual endowments of human capital – that is, skills and abilities that make persons more productive (Becker 1975). These include age, education, and prior job experience. Because labor market conditions are likely to be quite different for men and women, we also control for sex. The only household characteristic included for household heads is the size of the household, since those living in large households have the greatest need for reliable employment.

Among migrants, employment conditions are also affected by traits related to migrant background. As workers gain experience in the United States, they become more productive and valuable to US employers, resulting in more hours worked, better employment conditions, and higher wages. Labor market position is thus expected to improve with increases in the number of prior US trips and the duration of the most recent trip. We also control for the skill level of the work performed in the United States by noting whether the job involved agricultural labor, unskilled manual labor, or skilled labor.

A migrant's legal status depends on the documents acquired by the migrant and the use to which they are put. Undocumented migrants include those who crossed the border surreptitiously to work as well as those who entered with a tourist visa and later took a job. Braceros are migrants who entered as temporary agricultural workers under a special US sponsored program that lasted from 1942 to 1964. We also identify migrants who received amnesty as Special Agricultural Workers (SAWS) and distinguish them from others who became Legally Authorized Workers (LAWS). Documented migrants are all others, including permanent resident aliens ('green card' holders) and US citizens.

In addition to migrant characteristics, we expect that differences in the local labor markets in which migrants worked will affect their labor market outcomes. Among the migrants in our sample, the most popular destination

was Los Angeles followed by other places in California and Texas, and Chicago. To capture differences in employment opportunities and labor market conditions, we include a set of eight dummy variables for migrant destination with Los Angeles as the reference category.³

The ten sending communities vary in their degree of urbanization, resulting in different levels of preparation for work in the United States. Among the ten sample communities, four are from the state of Guanajuato: San Francisco del Rincón is a newly industrialized city in an otherwise rural area; León is a large, diversified city of more than a million inhabitants; Romita is a commercial center in a rich agricultural region; and Mineral de Pozos is an isolated, half-abandoned mining town located in the mountains. San Diego de Alejandría and Unión de San Antonio are located in the *Los Altos* region of Jalisco; they are traditional rural towns in a region of dry land farming and a long history of US migration. La Yerbabuena, Ario de Rayón, and Los Reyes are agricultural towns located in migrant-sending regions of Michoacán. Ixtlán del Río is a commercial center in a poor and mountainous farming region located in the state of Nayarit, just north of Jalisco. To conserve degrees of freedom, we include only one community-level variable indicating whether the community was rural or urban.

Our dependent variables address various facets of a migrant's labor market experience on their most recent trip to the United States. They include dichotomous variables indicating whether migrants worked in agriculture, whether they received wages in cash, and whether social security and income taxes were withheld from their pay. We also measured hours worked per week, hourly wage rates, and monthly income,⁴ with the latter two variables measured in constant 1985 dollars. In addition, because the most recent US trip may have occurred before IRCA but labor market outcomes may have occurred after IRCA, we include a control variable indicating whether migrants who entered before 1987 remained in the United States after IRCA's passage, extending into the 1987–90 period.

As mentioned earlier, our analysis takes two forms. First, we assess the extent to which all migrants have experienced changes in labor market conditions as a result of IRCA, and then we determine whether the penalties accruing to undocumented status have changed. Our before-and-after test relies on two dummy variables that identify the period in which the latest US trip was taken. One indicates the period immediately before IRCA (1983–1986) and the other corresponds to the post-IRCA years from 1987 through 1991; the period before 1983 serves as the reference category.

The regressions we estimated to test IRCA's before-and-after effects are summarized by the following equation:

$$\text{LMC} = \alpha + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \dots + \beta_{17} X_{17} + \epsilon \quad (1)$$

where

- LMC = the labor market condition in question (hours worked, wages earned, probability of being paid in cash, etc.);
- X_1 = sex of individual, with 1 being female and 0 male;
- X_2 = age in years;
- X_3 = age squared;
- X_4 = a vector of dummy variables for years of education, with no education being the reference category and persons with 1–3 years being coded as 1 and 0 otherwise; those with 4–5 years being coded as 1 and 0 otherwise; and persons with 6+ years being coded as 1 and 0 otherwise;
- X_5 = prior job experience in years;
- X_6 = number of members in household;
- X_7 = number of prior US trips;
- X_8 = length of current trip (in months);
- X_9 = three dummy variables representing the skill level of the US job: skilled (the reference category), unskilled and agricultural;
- X_{10} = a vector of dummy variables representing the legal status of migrants at the time of their most recent trip, with legal being the reference category, persons who entered as Braceros being coded as 1 and 0 otherwise, those who were SAWS being coded as 1 and 0 otherwise, those who were LAWS being coded as 1 and 0 otherwise, and persons who had no legal documents being coded as 1 and 0 otherwise;
- X_{11} = a dummy variable for whether a spouse accompanied migrants on their most recent trip (yes = 1; 0 otherwise);
- X_{12} = a dummy variable indicating whether a child accompanied migrants on their current trip (yes = 1; 0 otherwise);
- X_{13} = a dummy variable indicating whether other family members accompanied migrants on their current trip (yes = 1; 0 otherwise);
- X_{14} = a dummy variable indicating whether the individual's community of origin in Mexico is agrarian and 0 otherwise;
- X_{15} = whether the individual was part of the US sample (yes = 1; 0 otherwise);
- X_{16} = whether most recent trip spanned IRCA (yes = 1; 0 otherwise);
- X_{17} = a vector of dummy variables representing the pre-IRCA period (1983–1986) or post-IRCA period (1987–1990), with before 1983 representing the reference category; and
- ϵ = a disturbance term assumed to be normally distributed with zero constant variance (in OLS regression equations only).

The second part of the analysis seeks to assess whether and how the labor market penalties accruing to undocumented status changed as a result of IRCA. We thus estimate two regressions – one for years up through IRCA's passage in 1986 and another for the years afterward (1987–1990), yielding the following equation:

$$\text{LMC} = \alpha + \beta_1 X_1 + \dots + \beta_{16} X_{16} + \epsilon \quad (2)$$

where LMC = the labor market condition in question; X_1 – X_{16} are defined as in the prior equation;⁵ and ϵ = a disturbance term assumed to be normally distributed with zero constant variance (in OLS regression equations only).

We use OLS estimation methods to predict the three continuous outcome variables – hours worked per week, logged hourly wages, and logged monthly income – and maximum likelihood logistic regression procedures to predict dichotomous labor market outcomes – whether migrants were paid in cash, whether they had taxes withheld, and whether they worked in agriculture.⁶ For the sake of simplicity, we use the same set of independent variables in all models.

Findings

Our community informants have reported that labor market conditions have become more difficult in the wake of IRCA, particularly for undocumented migrants. With the mass legalization of 2.3 million Mexican migrants, local labor markets were suddenly inundated with a surfeit of ‘Rodinos’, as those who received amnesty are called in Mexico. With so many Rodinos available for work, undocumented migrants were put at a competitive disadvantage. Our informants in the field report that competition between Rodinos and undocumented workers has been particularly keen in agriculture, where the widespread use of fraudulent documents led to the approval of SAW applications greatly in excess of the number of agricultural jobs available in California and other farm states (see Rolph & Robyn 1991; Martin & Taylor 1988). As a result, informants state, undocumented migrants have been driven out of agrarian labor markets into the urban economy.

Table 1 therefore examines IRCA’s effect on the probability of working in agriculture in order to test the validity of these reports. In describing the results shown here and in subsequent tables, we will not comment in detail on the effects of demographic and human capital or local labor market variables, which are included in the models primarily as controls. In general these variables do not play large or consistent roles in determining labor market outcomes among Mexican migrants. Most outcomes depend on three basic factors: US migrant experience (the number and duration of trips), US legal status (legal, undocumented, Bracero, SAW, or LAW), and period (whether the trip was taken before or after IRCA). (Although coefficients for human capital variables are presented in the tables that follow, coefficients for local labor market and other controls are presented in the Appendix.)

The equation estimated for all migrants reveals that agricultural employment declines with age, is greatest for males, peaks among those with some

Table 1. Logistic regressions predicting the probability of working in agriculture: US migrants from ten Mexican communities

	Year of most recent US trip					
	All years		Before IRCA		After IRCA	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
<i>Demographic traits</i>						
Age	-0.190*	0.071	-0.256*	0.107	-0.128	0.108
Age squared	0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.001	0.001
Female (Ref = Male)	-1.033*	0.413	-0.768	0.511	-1.801*	0.863
<i>Human capital</i>						
No education	-	-	-	-	-	-
1-3 years of education	0.239	0.253	0.333	0.331	0.506	0.471
4-5 years of education	0.750*	0.374	1.266*	0.544	0.710	0.597
6+ years of education	0.474	0.495	1.076	0.729	0.176	0.770
Job experience	0.173*	0.061	0.301*	0.097	0.042	0.087
<i>Household size</i>						
Number of Prembers	0.033	0.028	0.017	0.032	0.072	0.058
<i>US migrant background</i>						
Number of prior trips	0.055*	0.016	0.086*	0.030	0.039*	0.021
Length of trip	-0.004*	0.002	-0.002	0.002	-0.021	0.016
<i>US Legal status</i>						
Legal immigrant	-	-	-	-	-	-
Undocumented	-0.443*	0.234	-0.068	0.338	-0.755*	0.339
Bracero	1.570*	0.447	2.304*	0.546	NA	NA
SAW	1.304*	0.384	NA	NA	1.128*	0.422
LAW	-0.338	0.463	NA	NA	-0.129	0.518
<i>US family connections</i>						
Spouse on trip	-0.316	0.249	-0.255	0.373	-0.328	0.344
Children on trip	0.162	0.304	-0.040	0.431	0.172	0.439
Other relatives on trip	-0.098	0.157	-0.148	0.203	-0.048	0.268
<i>Community of origin</i>						
Rural (Ref = Urban)	-0.157	0.203	-0.099	0.238	-0.256	0.410
<i>Period of last trip</i>						
Before 1983	-	-	-	-	-	-
Pre-IRCA (1983-86)	-0.544*	0.236	NA	NA	NA	NA
Post-IRCA (1987-90)	-0.595*	0.222	NA	NA	NA	NA
Intercept	2.097*	0.926	0.968	1.204	1.779	1.492
Log likelihood	-527.0		-326.0		-189.4	
% correctly predicted	71.6		72.0		69.5	
N	959		628		331	

* $p < 0.05$.

primary schooling, and grows as total job experience increases. Among migrant characteristics, farm employment increases as the number of trips grow, but falls as the duration of the latest trip rises. As migrants spend more time in the United States on any given trip, therefore, they become increasingly likely to switch from rural to urban employment.

According to the period coefficients, the likelihood of agricultural employment has fallen over time. Compared to migrants who left before 1983, those migrating in the years immediately preceding IRCA were significantly less likely to work in agriculture and the probability dropped even further after IRCA's passage in 1986. Thus, because there has been a general movement of Mexican migrants out of US agriculture over the years, it is difficult to attribute this shift to IRCA.

The effects of legal status are among the strongest in the model. Undocumented migrants were less likely than legal immigrants to work in agriculture; Braceros and SAWs were significantly more likely than legal immigrants to work in this sector, whereas LAWs may have been less likely to do so. This pattern is hardly surprising given that Braceros were admitted to the United States on visas that limited them to short-term agrarian jobs, whereas SAWs qualified for amnesty by virtue of their prior experience as farmworkers.

When the model is estimated separately for periods before and after IRCA, however, there is a marked change in the pattern of legal status effects. Whereas before IRCA legal and illegal migrants had roughly the same chance of working in agriculture, afterward undocumented migrants become markedly *less* likely to be employed as farmworkers. The contrast is especially great when compared to SAWs, who are significantly *more* likely than legal immigrants to work in agriculture. This pattern suggests that IRCA's impact on the likelihood of working in agriculture operates mainly through legal status. Consistent with the reports of our informants, undocumented migrants appear to have been driven out of agriculture and replaced by Special Agricultural Workers.

By employing newly legalized workers, employers avoid a host of difficulties associated with legal status, including the risk of sanctions. Although the increased competition has made it more difficult for all migrants to secure stable, full-time jobs after 1986, the onus fell especially on undocumented migrants. Table 2 considers the extent to which migrants have been able to achieve full-time employment by estimating a regression model to predict the hours worked per week among migrants from our ten sample communities.

The left-hand columns of Table 2 show an hours-worked function estimated with period variables to determine whether the amount of labor supplied by Mexican migrants has fallen in the wake of IRCA. The equation indicates that, net of other factors in the model, migrants in the sample worked about 49 hours per week (see the intercept). There is evidence that the number of hours has fallen after 1986, however. On trips taken between 1983 and 1986, migrants worked about one hour less than on those taken before 1983; but

Table 2. OLS regressions predicting hours worked per week among US migrants from ten Mexican communities

	Year of most recent US trip					
	All years		Before IRCA		After IRCA	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
<i>Demographic traits</i>						
Age	-0.578	0.397	-0.640	0.520	0.101	0.687
Age squared	0.001	0.002	-0.001	0.003	0.000	0.005
Female (Ref=Male)	3.901	3.210	3.917	4.099	0.230	5.912
<i>Human capital</i>						
No education	-	-	-	-	-	-
1-3 years of education	-3.025*	1.604	-2.958	1.935	-2.820	3.108
4-5 years of education	-2.560	2.280	-1.157	2.979	-3.649	3.890
6+ years of education	1.378	2.910	2.662	3.814	-0.776	4.814
Job experience	0.432	0.321	0.770*	0.433	-0.261	0.504
<i>Household size</i>						
Number of members	0.046	0.181	-0.062	0.213	0.228	0.382
<i>US migrant background</i>						
Number of prior trips	-0.043	0.099	0.034	0.169	-0.001	0.130
Length of trip	0.025*	0.014	0.032*	0.015	-0.045	0.062
<i>US occupation</i>						
Skilled worker	-	-	-	-	-	-
Unskilled worker	0.274	1.699	0.750	2.222	-1.929	2.844
Agricultural worker	0.940	1.808	2.181	2.388	-2.458	2.987
<i>US legal status</i>						
Legal immigrant	-	-	-	-	-	-
Undocumented	-4.136*	1.623	-3.668	2.277	-4.313*	2.328
Bracero	-0.856	2.287	-0.821	2.827	NA	NA
SAW	0.753	2.302	NA	NA	1.963	2.593
LAW	3.558	2.637	NA	NA	7.565*	3.323
<i>US family connections</i>						
Spouse on trip	0.231	1.485	0.584	2.235	0.137	2.103
Children on trip	-0.162	1.896	0.577	2.681	-1.346	2.742
Other relatives on trip	1.542	1.042	2.406*	1.325	0.263	1.792
<i>Community of origin</i>						
Rural (Ref = Urban)	7.254*	1.379	8.635*	1.606	3.326	2.846
<i>Period of last trip</i>						
Before 1983	-	-	-	-	-	-
Pre-IRCA (1983-86)	-0.974	1.652	NA	NA	NA	NA
Post-IRCA (1987-90)	-2.404*	1.591	NA	NA	NA	NA
Intercept	48.839*	6.325	41.138*	8.136	45.682*	10.479
R ²	0.084		0.097		0.041	
N	777		509		268	

* $p < 0.05$.

consistent with our informants' reports, after 1986 migrants worked about 2.4 hours less.

Table 2 also shows a strong and significant penalty for illegal status. Undocumented migrants worked about 4.1 fewer hours per week than legal migrants. When we estimate separate hours-worked models for trips taken before and after IRCA, moreover, the penalty accruing to undocumented status increases. The post-IRCA estimates clearly reveal the competitive disadvantage of undocumented migrants compared to the newly-legalized SAWs and LAWs. Compared to SAWs, illegal migrants worked a total of nearly 6.3 fewer hours per week [$1.963 - (-4.313)$], and compared to LAWs the differential was in the order of 12 hours [$7.565 - (-4.313)$]. In other words, in the wake of IRCA's amnesty undocumented migrants appear to have suffered in competition with SAWs and LAWs.

We now consider the effect of IRCA on the wages earned by Mexican migrants in the United States. As discussed earlier, prior research found an increase in the wage penalty accruing to undocumented status after IRCA's implementation, but this research did not consider legal and illegal migrants in comparison to newly legalized LAWs and SAWs (Donato & Massey 1991). Table 3 therefore estimates wage regressions to predict the log of hourly wages among all migrants, and among those migrating before and after IRCA. We estimated these models without controlling for sample selectivity because earlier research indicated that standard corrections had no effect on the equation estimates (see Massey 1987; Donato & Massey 1991).

The equation in the left-hand columns examines whether there was a general decline in wages among migrants after IRCA. Consistent with prior work, migrant wages are not strongly related to demographic background or human capital characteristics. Rather, the strongest effects are associated with migrant background: wages tend to increase as trip duration increases, and are enhanced by having a spouse present in the United States. Over time, however, there has been a general decline in the real value of US wages. People migrating between 1983 and 1986 earned 11 percent lower wages than those migrating before 1983, and those migrating after IRCA earned wages that were 19 percent lower. Although the secular decline in real wages predates IRCA's implementation, the equation also suggests that undocumented migrants earn about eight percent less than legal, SAWs, and LAWs (although the effect is not significant). In contrast to our earlier results, however, the degree of the wage penalty experienced by undocumented migrants does not appear to change after IRCA's passage in 1986. In both periods, there were no significant differences between the earnings of workers with and without documents, suggesting that IRCA affected wages more by increasing the supply of migrant workers (through the SAW and LAW programs) than by changing the way that employers penalize or reward legal status.

Table 4 continues our consideration of the competitive disadvantage of undocumented migrants after IRCA's passage by examining the monthly

Table 3. OLS regressions predicting logged hourly wages earned by US migrants from ten Mexican communities (in 1985 constant US dollars)

	Year of most recent US trip					
	All years		Before IRCA		After IRCA	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
<i>Demographic traits</i>						
Age	0.013	0.019	0.030	0.028	-0.011	0.023
Age squared	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Female (Ref = Male)	-0.418*	0.162	-0.525*	0.241	-0.148	0.201
<i>Human Capital</i>						
No education	-	-	-	-	-	-
1-3 years of education	0.037	0.077	-0.021	0.107	0.209*	0.104
4-5 years of education	0.048	0.106	0.005	0.158	0.248*	0.127
6+ years of education	0.022	0.136	-0.042	0.204	0.224	0.158
Job experience	-0.008	0.015	-0.014	0.022	0.087	0.017
<i>Household size</i>						
Number of members	-0.004	0.009	-0.011	0.012	0.007	0.012
<i>US migrant background</i>						
Number of prior trips	0.007	0.004	0.004	0.008	0.006	0.004
Length of trip	0.004*	0.001	0.005*	0.001	0.003	0.002
<i>US occupation</i>						
Skilled worker	-	-	-	-	-	-
Unskilled worker	-0.103	0.078	-0.110	0.116	-0.069	0.094
Agricultural worker	-0.178*	0.085	-0.136	0.128	-0.227*	0.100
<i>US, legal status</i>						
Legal immigrant	-	-	-	-	-	-
Undocumented	-0.084	0.074	-0.050	0.119	-0.064	0.076
Bracero	-0.120	0.115	-0.077	0.159	NA	NA
SAW	0.050	0.106	NA	NA	0.079	0.084
LAW	-0.090	0.121	NA	NA	0.040	0.112
<i>US family connections</i>						
Spouse on trip	0.147*	0.068	0.151	0.119	0.165*	0.066
Children on trip	0.123	0.089	0.213	0.148	0.099	0.091
Other relatives on trip	-0.005	0.049	0.016	0.072	-0.020	0.058
<i>Community of origin</i>						
Rural (Ref = Urban)	0.084	0.072	0.097	0.096	0.056	0.102
<i>Period of last trip</i>						
Before 1983	-	-	-	-	-	-
Pre-IRCA (1983-86)	-0.111*	0.077	NA	NA	NA	NA
Post-IRCA (1987-90)	-0.189*	0.073	NA	NA	NA	NA
Intercept	1.432*	0.310	1.102*	0.457	1.315*	0.355
R ²	0.196		0.183		0.194	
N	656		410		246	

* $p < 0.05$

income of migrants in the United States. As the left-hand columns indicate, monthly income increases as the duration of trips rise and when spouses and other relatives are present, but it is lowest for agricultural workers compared to skilled or unskilled workers. Differences also appear in the effects for legal status: undocumented migrants and SAWS have lower monthly incomes than legal migrants and Bracero.

Significant differences also appear in the period coefficients, which reveal a decline in real earnings after 1986. Compared to those who left before 1983, those migrating in the years after IRCA's passage had lower monthly incomes. When the earnings equations are estimated separately by period, we observe significant differences between undocumented and legal migrants in both periods, but the change in the coefficient for legal status before and after IRCA is small.

Competition from Rodinos seems to have increased the relative power of employers in the labor market and informants have reported a deterioration of working conditions in recent years. With so many immigrant workers available for hire, US employers have had little incentive to offer better terms of employment. Moreover, to the extent that they employ undocumented workers, IRCA may have created an incentive to keep the job clandestine through various devices, such as paying wages in cash and not deducting taxes from earnings. In order to assess IRCA's effect on the terms and conditions of employment, and to examine whether it provided an impetus for the emergence of an underground labor market, Tables 5 and 6 examine whether or not migrants were paid in cash, and whether or not they had taxes withheld from their pay.

The first set of estimates reveals that IRCA had no measurable effect on the likelihood of being paid in cash. The only variable that is consistently significant is the number of prior trips to the United States. As migrants accumulate more trips, and hence more experience in the US economy, they are progressively less likely to work in marginal jobs that pay cash wages. Neither legal status nor period of trip is related to the likelihood of receiving cash for pay, and there are no real differences when the model is estimated before and after IRCA. The only exception is for undocumented migrants, who are more likely than legal migrants to receive cash wages after IRCA's passage, but the effect was only marginally significant ($p < 0.10$).

The estimates shown in Table 6, however, suggest that IRCA had a significant effect in driving undocumented migrants toward underground employment. Although the model shown in the left-hand columns indicates that IRCA did not have a general effect in lowering the odds of having taxes withheld, the pre- and post-1986 models suggest that IRCA did affect the way undocumented migrants are treated by employers. Whereas before IRCA legal and illegal migrants were equally likely to have taxes withheld, afterward undocumented migrants were markedly less likely than other status groups to report tax withholding. In the wake of IRCA, therefore, undocu-

Table 4. OLS regressions predicting logged monthly income earned by US migrants from ten Mexican communities (in 1985 constant dollars)

	Year of most recent US trip					
	All years		Before IRCA		After IRCA	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
<i>Demographic traits</i>						
Age	0.016*	0.005	0.019*	0.006	0.015	0.010
Age squared	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000
Female (Ref = Male)	0.008	0.043	-0.082*	0.049	0.171*	0.089
<i>Human capital</i>						
No education	-	-	-	-	-	-
1-3 years of education	0.017	0.020	0.017	0.022	0.010	0.043
4-5 years of education	-0.003	0.029	-0.005	0.035	0.006	0.055
6+ years of education	-0.002	0.038	-0.019	0.045	-0.017*	0.069
Job experience	-0.008*	0.004	-0.012*	0.005	-0.003	0.008
<i>Household size</i>						
Number of members	-0.001	0.002	-0.002	0.002	0.003	0.005
<i>US migrant background</i>						
Number of prior trips	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.002
Length of trip	0.002*	0.000	0.002*	0.001	0.003*	0.001
<i>US occupation</i>						
Skilled worker	-	-	-	-	-	-
Unskilled worker	-0.005	0.023	0.015	0.027	-0.054	0.041
Agricultural worker	-0.150*	0.024	0.141*	0.029	0.189*	0.043
<i>US legal status</i>						
Legal immigrant	-	-	-	-	-	-
Undocumented	-0.132*	0.020	-0.106*	0.025	-0.158*	0.032
Bracero	0.054*	0.029	0.092*	0.032	NA	NA
SAW	-0.113*	0.030	NA	NA	-0.117*	0.037
LAW	-0.041	0.034	NA	NA	-0.002	0.046
<i>US family connections</i>						
Spouse on trip	0.034*	0.020	0.063*	0.027	0.023	0.031
Children on trip	0.006	0.025	0.010	0.033	0.008	0.039
Other relatives on trip	0.033*	0.013	0.005	0.016	0.069*	0.026
<i>Community of origin</i>						
Rural (Ref = Urban)	-0.062*	0.017	-0.050*	0.018	-0.093*	0.040
<i>Period of last trip</i>						
Before 1983	-	-	-	-	-	-
Pre-IRCA (1983-86)	0.003	0.021	NA	NA	NA	NA
Post-IRCA (1987-90)	-0.061*	0.020	NA	NA	NA	NA
Intercept	6.436*	0.079	6.421*	0.093	6.358*	0.144
R ²	0.547		0.599		0.386	
N	888		584		304	

* $p < 0.05$

Table 5. Logistic regressions predicting the probability of being paid in cash rather than by check: US migrants from ten Mexican communities

	Year of most recent US trip					
	All years		Before IRCA		After IRCA	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
<i>Demographic traits</i>						
Age	0.023	0.086	0.092	0.096	-0.223	0.252
Age squared	-0.001	0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.001	0.001
Female (Ref = Male)	-0.228	0.626	0.506	0.705	-6.043	59.485
<i>Human capital</i>						
No education	0.373	0.302	0.506	0.330	-0.539	0.920
1-3 years of education	0.703	0.452	0.487	0.519	0.916	1.213
4-5 years of education	0.492	0.605	0.422	0.673	0.921	1.680
6+ years of education	0.053	0.073	-0.013	0.080	0.275	0.220
Job experience						
<i>Household size</i>						
Number of members	-0.015	0.020	-0.001	0.035	0.002	0.120
<i>US migrant background</i>						
Number of prior trips	-0.118*	0.033	-0.142*	0.048	-0.089*	0.050
Length of trip	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.002	-0.071	0.046
<i>US occupation</i>						
Skilled worker	-	-	-	-	-	-
Unskilled worker	-0.025	0.343	0.020	0.418	-0.089	0.746
Agricultural worker	-0.126	0.359	-0.119	0.435	-0.356	0.796
<i>US legal status</i>						
Legal immigrant	-	-	-	-	-	-
Undocumented	0.439	0.322	0.144	0.400	1.056	0.652
Bracero	0.437	0.421	-0.005	0.484	NA	NA
SAW	-0.410	0.680	NA	NA	-1.037	0.942
LAW	-0.591	0.798	NA	NA	-0.324	1.182
<i>US family connections</i>						
Spouse on trip	-0.377	0.344	-1.053*	0.502	0.623	0.623
Children on trip	0.528	0.382	0.409	0.498	1.153	0.756
Other relatives on trip	0.179	0.202	-0.030	0.234	1.585*	0.597
<i>Community of origin</i>						
Rural (Ref = Urban)	-0.163	0.232	-0.308	0.255	0.718	0.751
<i>Period of last trip</i>						
Before 1983	-	-	-	-	-	-
Pre-IRCA (1983-86)	0.181	0.305	NA	NA	NA	NA
Post-IRCA (1987-90)	-0.169	0.305	NA	NA	NA	NA
Intercept	-3.599*	1.256	-3.962*	1.491	-2.270	2.946
Log likelihood	-374.4		-282.2		-71.0	
% correctly predicted	82.8		79.3		90.3	
N	899		589		310	

* $p < 0.05$.

Table 6. Logistic regressions predicting the probability of having taxes withheld from pay: US migrants from ten Mexican communities

	Year of most recent US trip					
	All years		Before IRCA		After IRCA	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Age	0.101	0.077	0.139	0.099	0.056	0.151
Age squared	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.001	0.001
Female (Ref = Male)	-0.764	0.534	-1.067	0.667	-0.190	1.432
<i>Human capital</i>						
No education	-	-	-	-	-	-
1-3 years of education	0.062	0.268	0.031	0.314	-0.286	0.624
4-5 years of education	-0.175	0.411	-0.531	0.513	0.431	0.841
6+ years of education	-0.344	0.543	-0.779	0.683	0.055	1.028
Job experience	-0.090	0.067	-0.122	0.087	-0.023	0.121
<i>Household size</i>						
Number of members	-0.014	0.029	-0.017	0.033	-0.003	0.084
<i>US migrant background</i>						
Number of prior trips	0.051*	0.021	0.067*	0.029	0.040	0.030
Length of trip	0.002	0.002	0.004	0.002	0.111*	0.040
<i>US occupation</i>						
Skilled worker	-	-	-	-	-	-
Unskilled worker	0.663*	0.315	0.216	0.410	1.546*	0.596
Agricultural worker	0.119	0.316	-0.360	0.412	1.140*	0.590
<i>US legal status</i>						
Legal immigrant	-	-	-	-	-	-
Undocumented	-0.545*	0.269	-0.047	0.355	-1.224*	0.456
Bracero	-0.354	0.360	0.198	0.428	NA	NA
SAW	0.017	0.471	NA	NA	0.128	0.601
LAW	1.500	1.071	NA	NA	9.349	58.896
<i>US family connections</i>						
Spouse on trip	1.532*	0.354	1.801*	0.486	1.619*	0.625
Children on trip	-0.317	0.375	-0.477	0.478	0.105	0.697
Other relatives on trip	0.445*	0.178	0.595*	0.212	-0.106	0.388
<i>Community of origin</i>						
Rural (Ref = Urban)	1.212*	0.218	1.314*	0.252	1.211*	0.530
<i>Period of last trip</i>						
Before 1983	-	-	-	-	-	-
Pre-IRCA (1983-86)	-0.437	0.268	NA	NA	NA	NA
Post-IRCA (1987-900)	-0.060	0.254	NA	NA	NA	NA
Intercept	-1.427	1.062	-2.054	1.327	-2.000	2.124
Log likelihood	-449.3		-322.2		-107.7	
% correctly predicted	76.8		73.3		84.5	
N	889		589		310	

* $p < 0.05$.

mented migrants appear to have been pushed toward more irregular, exploitive jobs which pay cash wages and do not withhold taxes.

Conclusion

Across a series of analyses we have examined the effect of IRCA on different labor market conditions. Using a unique dataset gathered from Mexican migrants located in their home communities and US destination areas, we find some support for the view that IRCA affected labor force conditions facing Mexican migrants. Although estimated period effects did not indicate a clear break in wage rates, the likelihood of working in agriculture, being paid in cash, or having taxes withheld in the wake of IRCA, hours worked and monthly income both declined in the post-IRCA period. Thus, IRCA's amnesty provisions may have led to adverse effects on earnings and labor supply.

Our analyses also reveal a fairly consistent pattern of deterioration in the labor market conditions facing undocumented migrants. When models were estimated separately among migrants who worked in the United States before and after IRCA, we found clear evidence of changes in the penalties attached to undocumented status. Compared to illegal migrants working in the United States before 1987, those migrating during 1987 or later worked fewer hours, were less likely to have taxes withheld from their pay, and were less likely to work in agricultural jobs. In other words, undocumented migrants appeared to be pushed from the agrarian to the urban economy, and were less able to compete with respect to the terms and conditions of employment, compared to legal migrants with the same characteristics.

This pattern of results suggests that employers have begun to treat and evaluate undocumented migrants differently than legal immigrants. Studies of Mexican migrants carried out before IRCA generally showed that legal and illegal migrants experienced similar labor market outcomes once background differences were controlled (see Massey 1987) and, with a few exceptions, our pre-IRCA estimates are consistent with this pattern. After IRCA's passage in 1987, however, undocumented migrants appear to have suffered a deterioration in their labor market position, a conclusion that is consistent with the reports of informants we have interviewed in the field.

Despite the deterioration in employment conditions among undocumented migrants, however, another analysis of the same dataset has revealed that IRCA has in no way deterred undocumented migrants from migrating; probabilities of new migration have continued at high levels (Donato et al. 1992). The new law has thus created a situation where undocumented migration continues despite the disadvantaged employment terms being offered to those without documents, and despite employer preferences for legalized SAWs and LAWs. Rather than stopping the flow of undocumented migrants,

therefore, IRCA appears simply to have spurred the growth of an underground economy.

In part, these changes may reflect increased discrimination against illegal migrants by employers, but it is also likely to reflect the large increase in the immigrant labor supply growing out of IRCA's amnesty programs. Together, continued undocumented migration and some 2.3 million newly legalized Mexican migrants have flooded immigrant labor markets in key regions of California and Texas, substantially increasing the competition for jobs. Undocumented migrants suffered most from this crowding, since newly legalized workers offered advantages to employers, allowing them to avoid risks and disruptions associated with the employment of undocumented workers.

Acknowledgement

This research was made possible by grants from the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (HD-24041) and the Sloan Foundation, whose support is gratefully acknowledged.

Notes

1. Although the ten communities are not strictly representative of all migrant-sending areas, they were chosen to cover the principal sending states in Mexico – Jalisco, Guanajuato, Michoacan, and Nayarit. They were also chosen to include a variety of economic bases (see text below).
2. Because this information was collected at the time of the survey, we derived new indicators of age and job experience based on the year of last US trip. Age was calculated by subtracting migrant's year of birth from the year of last US trip. Prior job experience was derived by subtracting the sum of five plus the number of years in school from the age at most recent trip.
3. We recognize that controls for local labor markets should ideally include specific attributes of the labor market, such as unemployment and average wage rates. To do this, however, we faced two problems. The first is related to data availability. Because information on employment is published for selected labor markets and comparable data is available only for the years 1980–1990 (see US Department of Labor 1991), the inclusion of this information in our dataset would have reduced the number of households heads in our dataset to 576. The second problem is that we found little variation in migrants' destinations to which we could assign specific labor market characteristics. Approximately 28 percent of migrants in our sample had an unknown place of destination, and of those remaining, over 80 percent went to Los Angeles or other places in California. Thus, in the present analysis, we control for market differences by using dummy variables and examine IRCA's impact *net* of local labor markets. In the future, we will examine how specific attributes of local markets affect the occupational rewards and work conditions of migrants who entered the United States in the 1980s.
4. We constructed net monthly income by taking a migrant's reported hourly US wage, multiplying it by four times the number of hours worked per week, and from this, subtracting the migrant's estimate of the amount of money spent each month for food and housing while in the United States. Although there were few missing values on any single variable, missing

data cumulated because estimates of net monthly income were not calculated if any single piece of information was missing. To circumvent this problem, we used instrumental variable techniques to generate estimates for all missing values required for the construction of net monthly income, using the following equation: Missing value = $f(\text{year of first US trip, duration of first US trip, first US occupation, and legal status of first US trip})$. These variables satisfy the conditions for identification using two-stage least squares and do not appear in the equations we estimate later in this paper.

5. Note that X_{16} is included only in the regressions for years up through 1986.
6. We logged hourly wages and monthly income to improve the fit; weekly hours worked were not logged because it did not improve model fit.

Appendix: Coefficients for local labor markets, whether trips spanned IRCA, and whether respondent was in US sample

Model	Year of most recent US trip					
	All years		Before IRCA		After IRCA	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Predicting the probability of working in agriculture						
<i>Trip spanned IRCA</i>	-0.464	0.354	-2.377*	0.729	-	-
<i>US sample</i>	-1.266*	0.311	-0.443	0.366	-0.859*	0.379
Predicting hours worked						
<i>Local labor market</i>						
Los Angeles, CA	-	-	-	-	-	-
San Francisco and other Bay Area, CA	0.793	3.133	1.544	3.706	2.214	6.275
San Diego, CA	1.050	2.482	1.772	3.062	-1.938	4.424
Other CA	0.455	1.404	0.562	1.770	0.787	2.461
Dallas, Houston, and San Antonio, TX	-3.906	2.521	-3.228	2.969	-6.871	5.334
Chicago, IL	2.156	2.725	3.574	3.125	0.219	6.136
Reno, NV	4.754	4.359	2.389	5.573	7.983	7.194
Other	5.061*	1.471	4.660*	1.862	5.540*	2.572
<i>Trip spanned IRCA</i>	-3.418	2.326	-3.870	2.622	-	-
<i>US sample</i>	-1.567	1.839	0.672	3.230	-2.426	2.442
Predicting logged wages						
<i>Local labor market</i>						
Los Angeles, CA	-	-	-	-	-	-
San Francisco and other Bay Area, CA	0.020	0.163	0.071	0.223	-0.065	0.216
San Diego, CA	-0.053	0.120	-0.176	0.171	0.240	0.147
Other CA	0.101	0.067	0.083	0.098	0.142*	0.081
Dallas, Houston, and San Antonio, TX	0.121	0.120	0.114	0.163	0.150	0.179
Chicago, IL	0.447*	0.137	0.530*	0.179	0.131	0.216
Reno, NV	-0.115	0.210	-0.169	0.323	-0.047	0.227
Other	0.109	0.072	0.038	0.105	0.248*	0.087
<i>Trip spanned IRCA</i>	-0.077	0.116	-0.143	0.155	-	-
<i>US sample</i>	0.203*	0.083	0.202	0.167	0.253*	0.078

Model	Year of most recent US trip					
	All years		Before IRCA		After IRCA	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Predicting logged monthly income						
<i>Local labor market</i>						
Los Angeles, CA	-	-	-	-	-	-
San Francisco and other Bay Area, CA	-0.087*	0.041	-0.060	0.045	-0.162*	0.086
San Diego, CA	-0.030	0.032	0.020	0.037	0.006	0.060
Other CA	-0.010	0.018	-0.036*	0.021	0.023	0.035
Dallas, Houston, and San Antonio, TX	-0.003	0.033	-0.019	0.034	-0.031	0.080
Chicago, IL	-0.035	0.036	-0.080*	0.037	0.156*	0.093
Reno, NV	-0.027	0.060	0.029	0.069	-0.098	0.109
Other	0.001	0.019	0.003	0.022	0.027	0.035
<i>Trip spanned IRCA</i>	-0.114*	0.030	-0.043	0.029	-	-
<i>US sample</i>	-0.031	0.024	-0.202*	0.038	0.036	0.036
 Predicting the likelihood of receiving cash wages						
<i>Local labor market</i>						
Los Angeles, CA	-	-	-	-	-	-
San Francisco and other Bay Area, CA	-0.454	0.651	-0.193	0.681	-8.738	58.830
San Diego, CA	0.263	0.449	0.435	0.512	0.255	1.261
Other CA	-0.089	0.273	-0.109	0.312	0.169	0.668
Dallas, Houston, and San Antonio, TX	1.087*	0.399	1.259*	0.452	-0.924	1.241
Chicago, IL	0.561	0.454	0.475	0.497	-0.081	1.376
Reno, NV	0.653	0.718	-0.908	1.168	4.039*	1.594
Other	0.055	0.284	0.173	0.320	-0.391	0.720
<i>Trip spanned IRCA</i>	-0.686*	0.418	-0.749*	0.454	-	-
<i>U.S. sample</i>	1.008*	0.419	1.542*	0.644	0.110	0.759
 Predicting whether taxes were withheld						
<i>Local labor market</i>						
Los Angeles, CA	-	-	-	-	-	-
San Francisco and other Bay Area, CA	0.793	0.567	0.791	0.643	0.914	1.261
San Diego, CA	0.745*	0.393	0.941*	0.487	0.387	0.831
Other CA	0.605*	0.240	0.532*	0.274	1.186*	0.624
Dallas, Houston, and San Antonio, TX	-0.548	0.385	-0.595	0.441	-0.079	0.964
Chicago, IL	0.652	0.477	0.822	0.524	0.014	1.222
Reno, NV	0.324	0.797	-0.409	0.985	10.257	159.650
Other	0.345	0.240	0.604*	0.290	-0.233	0.484
<i>Trip spanned IRCA</i>	0.383	0.388	0.477	0.402	-	-
<i>U.S. sample</i>	0.134	0.405	-0.314	0.620	-0.526	0.688

* $p < 0.05$.

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Address for correspondence: Katherine M. Donato, Department of Sociology, Louisiana State University, 126 Shubbs Hall, Baton Rouge, LA 70803, USA.
Tel.: (504) 388 53 57; Fax: (504) 388 5102.